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Chapter XX 
The world can certainly be a painful place to live. We can insulate ourselves from the daily reports, but we tend to hear 
and see them even when we do not desire it. We don't have to look very far--just to live in a world with others is to be 
involved. We are all distressed by the suffering we endure, and by what we observe around us. We are confronted by 
adversity and affliction--or it confronts us!--whether we call ourselves atheists, agnostics, pantheists, or theists. All of us 
labor under these burdens.  
Atheism & Evil: A Fatal Dilemma 
So far, we have treated the problem of pain and evil as if it affected theists alone. In particular, we have asked how such 
problems are consistent with belief in God. Theists just seem to take a defensive posture rather than go on the offensive 
when questioned about their faith. But in this chapter we want to turn the issue around. Strangely enough, atheists have 
their own conceptual problems with suffering--and several of them are major, indeed. We will look at some of dilemmas 
here.  
A. Are There Contradictions in Theism?  
We have said that some atheologians, taking a harder line than their colleagues, hold that the orthodox concept of God is 
actually contradictory. They maintain that one or more of God's attributes conflicts with the presence of evil in the world. 
But is this actually the case?  
We will begin by distinguishing between two sorts of epistemological(1) predicaments: logical dilemmas and those that 
only appear to be so. Mavrodes refers to the first as a "hard" dilemma, one where the core beliefs are logically 
incompatible with each other. "Soft" dilemmas occur when someone falsely believes that these beliefs are irreconcilable.(2)  
Based on a similar distinction, Nash addresses the atheologians' objection by summarizing Plantinga's "theistic set" as 
follows:  
1. God exists. 
2. God is omnipotent. 
3. God is omniscient. 
4. God is omnibenevolent. 
5. God created the world. 
and 
6. The world contains evil.(3)  
Specifically, where is the contradiction in this "theistic set"? It would appear to be difficult to prove one here. Prominent 
atheologian J. L. Mackie actually admits "that there is no explicit contradiction between the statements that there is an 
omnipotent and wholly good god and that there is evil." Yet he thinks that if additional premises are added, the 
contradiction will become obvious. He suggests appending "the at least initially plausible premises" that an omnibenevolent 
being would eliminate evil as far as he can and that such a being has no limits.(4)  
The theist might respond in a twofold manner. (1) There are apparently no direct contradictions in the theistic set above, 
at least according to Mackie. This is significant in itself. (2) The premises that the atheologian would like to add in order to 
force a contradiction also fail to do an adequate job, as we argued in the last chapter. We will briefly review some of our 
conclusions.  
Using Mackie's examples, should God eliminate evil as far as He can? The theist might ask how such would be possible 
without limiting human freedom? Moreover, might such action actually have the negative consequence of reducing the 
good that results from the suffering? Further, and perhaps most difficult of all, how could finite beings ever know whether 
God already accomplishes just what Mackie suggests?  
Or can an omnipotent God do anything, as per Mackie's second question? Orthodox theology has long insisted that there 
are things that even an omnipotent God cannot do--such as contradictory actions. So again, the issue concerns whether 
God could remove the evil without contradicting the free will of His creatures. We are right back at our earlier point. No 
one has shown how either of these options involves a contradiction.(5)  
Nash mentions another possible atheological objection: couldn't God eliminate all the evil that He can without either 
forfeiting a greater good or allowing a greater evil? But once again, how could it ever be determined that this is not the 
very case we have at present? Arguing against the type or amount of evil in the world gets us back to the options 
entertained and dismissed in the last chapter. So this creative suggestion does not eliminate evil or otherwise cause us to 
reformulate our theistic set above, failing to do the job for the critic. In fact, Nash asserts that "our new proposition is 
totally consistent with the existence of evil in God's creation."(6)  
Besides, as Mavrodes counters, the theist is certainly justified in offering a counter argument to the existence of evil in 
God's universe. Mavrodes explicates it this way:  
If God is omnipotent and benevolent, then He cannot allow evil unless there is a justification for allowing it. But He 
obviously does allow it. Consequently, if He is omnipotent and benevolent, then He has a justification for allowing evil. He 
is benevolent and omnipotent. Therefore, He is justified in allowing evil.(7)  
In other words, although atheologians are fond of juxtaposing the actual existence of evil over against the orthodox 
doctrine of God, theists can just as well counter with the above argument. The logical form of the first argument is no 
more valid than that of the second.(8)  
So atheologians reach a roadblock here. They have been unsuccessful in discovering the "missing premise" that would 
prove the theistic set stated above to be contradictory. Nash concludes the matter this way: "Even though atheologians 
have been claiming for decades that the theistic set is self-contradictory, none of them has yet produced the required 
missing proposition that will prove the claim . . . . we are still waiting for him to show that his claim is true."(9)  
B. Evil is Position- and Person-Related  
Most people speak of the quandary we are discussing in our last three chapters as the problem of pain and evil. Even most 
scholars appear to think of the overall subject as if it were primarily one, major issue. Our readers might even have 
noticed that, up until this point, that is how it has been discussed in this book, too. But while we have been satisfied until 
now to deal with the more general features, it is time to be more specific. The answers that one gives to the problem of 
evil largely depend on the perspective from which one is answering--the general world view and the specific "twists" 
contained in one's position, as well as one's personal outlook.  
The first matter is nicely summarized by John Feinberg:  
the notion that there is one and only one theological/philosophical problem of evil is mistaken . . . . 'the 
theological/philosophical problem of evil' does not refer to one problem, but to a series of problems that arise in regard to 
various theological positions as such positions are coupled with their respective normative ethical views.(10)  
Then how are we to judge whether the problem of evil actually causes a predicament with regard to a particular view? 
Again, Feinberg is helpful. As encountered within a particular philosophical or theological system, the presence of a 
dilemma "always" depends on the logical consistency of propositions internal to that view.(11)  
Accordingly, the problem of evil involves a host of issues, depending on the particular system of thought being addressed. 
In order to see if any specific position is adversely affected, one must view the charge against the logical consistency of 
the whole. Such is a question of internal congruity, especially since we already saw that there is no explicit contradiction in 
the theistic set.  
When such distinctions are made, it is entirely possible that certain theistic views will appear to be inconsistent, while 
others may pass the test just fine. Feinberg investigated eight theistic responses to evil and concluded that six of them 
were internally consistent.(12)  
There is another significant consideration that follows from this perspective. The atheologian may continue to utilize the 
problem of evil to object to theistic systems (often without making any distinctions between them). But as long as a 
system links the notions of God's omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence with the presence of evil in a way that is 
logically consistent, then the atheologian must object on other grounds.(13)  
This last consideration is a crucial one. There is no explicit contradiction between theism and evil. Therefore, if the theistic 
system in question is internally consistent, then the atheologian must utilize a critique other than juxtaposing the problem 
of evil over against a specific species of theism. This potentially removes much of the sting of the atheological objection 
from pain and suffering.  
But there is still another aspect to this situation. Not only must the matter of evil be evaluated against a specific 
theological system, but we can break the inquiry down even further. There appears to be a very personal feature in 
discussions on this subject. Not all sensitive, knowledgeable theists are bothered by the issues involved. In short, many 
just don't perceive the force of the objection.(14) While it is quite true that one's feelings on this subject are not 
determinative, this is precisely the point. The problem is not a conflict between logically-irreconcilable positions, but one 
involving the beliefs and tastes of the individuals themselves.  
George Mavrodes expands on this last suggestion, indicating that the issue of evil does not exist in a vacuum. There must 
be a person who thinks that there is a problem. However, just because someone experiences such a dilemma, this 
provides no logical reason to conclude that someone else ought to have the same problem. In short, the problem of 
suffering is person-related. The matter of pain and evil fails to involve any objective conflicts, and there is a strong 
subjective element.(15)  
In fact, Mavrodes makes some rather direct comments on the logical nature of the dilemma. He says: ". . . one person's 
belief in a core that someone else takes to be inconsistent constitutes no dilemma for the believer."(16) Some skeptics will 
argue that the theist is simply avoiding a difficult quandary--that he is, in effect, "copping out" of the problem. But 
Mavrodes answers again:  
The important point is that the critic who makes a truth- or logic-oriented objection is not in a privileged position . . . . In 
particular, the fact that the critic is unconvinced by the theologian counts for no more than the fact that the theologian is 
unconvinced by the critic. Of course, the theological defender is almost uniformly charged with the burden of proof, while 
critics of his views are often thought to have no such obligation. But this is merely an accidental feature of the current 
state of culture and philosophy; it has no basis in logic and reason. In particular, if the claim that the problem of evil 
involves no real contradiction obligates its proponent to prove this claim, then the claim that the problem does involve a 
real contradiction should place an analogous obligation on its proponent.(17)  
Thus we conclude this second consideration. There is no such thing as the problem of evil. There is only a dilemma in 
theological or philosophical systems that are internally inconsistent in terms of the logic involved.  
Further, in systems where there is no logical contradiction (of which there are probably a fair number), the issues are 
person-related. Some believers think they have a perfectly good response and will not be bothered by this problem at all. 
But the critic's lack of convincing counts nothing against the theistic position, any more than the believer not being 
convinced counts against the atheological position. This all seems to place the atheologian in the unenviable position of 
having to prove that there are logical conflicts in every theistic system.  
C. Recognizing Evil  
In spite of the two difficulties for the atheologian that we have already mentioned, perhaps the worst of their problems is 
an inherent dilemma in their own system. The charge was eloquently leveled by C. S. Lewis, as a telling argument against 
his own naturalism. How can atheists even question the existence of a Creator based on the pain and evil in the world? 
Since atheists seldom recognize the existence of any absolute right or wrong, they have no basis for identifying the 
presence of evil. Lewis explains it like this:  
My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and 
unjust? . . . Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But 
if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too--for the argument depended on saying that the world was really 
unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my private fancies. Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did 
not exist--in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless--I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality--
namely my idea of justice--was full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple.(18)  
We need to expand upon Lewis' point a bit, for there appears to be a hidden assumption or two here. He is charging that 
the atheist has a very serious dilemma. If there is no absolute standard of right and wrong, as most atheists appear to 
believe, then the atheist has no right to utilize the presence of pain and evil in the world against the orthodox view of God. 
The reason is straightforward--in the absence of ethical absolutes, then even the real presence of profound suffering is not 
actually something that is objectively wrong. So while the pain would still be real (not an illusion) it is simply a reality 
devoid of any ethical consequences.  
To say it another way, the atheist's objections to the suffering in the world amount to little more than their personal 
dissatisfaction with certain aspects of reality. In the absence of objective ethical standards, then Lewis appears to be 
correct: atheistic complaints to evil constitute some "private idea" of right and wrong, and evil is simply something that 
"did not happen to please my private fancies," nothing more.  
How might the atheist respond to this argument? One option is to assert that there really are ethical absolutes in the 
universe. But such an alternative is unpalatable to the majority of atheists.(19) Not only does it conflict with their 
widespread notions of human freedom and lack of objective values, but it seems to backfire into the major premise of the 
moral argument for God's existence (see next chapter). In brief, if absolute, objective ethical standards exist, then it is 
very difficult to explain them as being the result of chance evolution.  
To summarize briefly, the atheist can only use the problem of evil to object to the orthodox conception of God if there is 
some standard by which to recognize the evil in the first place. Apart from such a standard, suffering is reduced to 
unfortunate feelings of dislike for the pain. On the other hand, if there is such an objective criterion, then the question 
must include the existence of such a measurement in a chance universe. In short, if evil objectively exists, then God would 
appear to exist as well, with some sort of relationship between such a Being and the evil.  
D. The Theistic World View Versus Naturalism  
The atheologian could very well make another sort of response to the dilemma we just outlined for her. It could be 
asserted that atheists don't have to recognize objective values in order to advance the issue of evil against Christian 
theism. Rather, they can raise the problem from within theism as an internal problem for this world view to solve, since it 
does recognize an absolute standard of right and wrong.  
Here's another way to look at the objection. We said above that the question of evil is an internal matter of consistency 
within a system, and this response questions that coherence. To say it popularly, the atheologian basically issues the 
challenge to stage the contest in the theistic ball park, since she cannot play in her own.  
The theistic reply might first be to point out that, at worst, she is in the same place where she began two chapters ago. 
Thus the atheological response doesn't change anything. It only reasserts the former position, which we have answered in 
much depth. In short, God allows evil for the greater goods that are potentially achieved, particularly regarding creaturely 
free will, natural laws, and soul-making.  
Then theists might assert, as we did above, that the atheologian has not been successful in pointing out any actual 
contradictions in the theistic system. Further, the atheologian must also specify which theistic perspective she is referring 
to, since this is only a problem for systems that are susceptible to the criticism and for individuals who "feel the crunch."  
But there is still another reply that will put the issue in a broader context. If the atheologian insists on playing in the 
theistic ball park (since the atheologian has, in effect, no home field!), then we need to look at the two starting line-ups. It 
is seldom recognized that naturalism, per se, offers comparatively few positive arguments in favor of its position. The 
naturalist primarily features the problem of evil and responses to contrary positions. As Trueblood asserts concerning the 
case against God's existence, "The chief negative evidences constitute the problem of evil."(20)  
But naturalists cannot even offer evil as an argument that favors their position, since they cannot officially recognize its 
nature. Thus, if we are correct here, naturalism is largely a world view that must resort to objecting to theism's arguments 
(including proposing evil as an internal problem) rather than supporting their own system. From the outset of the "ball 
game," this severely limits their offensive "punch."  
On the other hand, theism (and Christian theism in particular) can offer a multitude of arguments in its favor. Some of 
these evidences have been included in this book. The existence of God (Sections I and II), the origin of life (Chapters 15), 
the trustworthiness of the New Testament (Chapter 26), the historicity of Jesus' resurrection (Chapter 27), the uniqueness 
of Jesus Christ (Chapter 28), and God's personal involvement with His people (Chapter 30) are some examples. Other 
theistic evidences might include a carefully constructed case from fulfilled prophecies of various types,(21) and several 
arguments for life after death.(22)  
Now here's the point of analyzing the naturalistic and theistic "starting line-ups." While we have said that the former relies 
chiefly on critiques of opposing positions, theism offers both numerous positive arguments in its favor, as well as excellent 
critiques of naturalism itself.(23) There's nothing wrong with naturalists desiring to utilize evil in order to offer an internal 
critique of theism, but they cannot expect theists to play by naturalistic rules, since they have none by which to judge the 
existence of suffering.  
Therefore, to play in the theistic ball park is fine, but naturalists must be prepared to view evil as an internal problem for 
theism. But as such, the problem must be viewed in light of the many arguments which both evidence theism and argue 
against naturalism. In other words, it is certainly true that evil exists, sometimes in great quantities. And we don't always 
know why we suffer (Chapter 22). But it is also true that this is a universe where God exists, and where He created life, 
predicted the future, directed the writing of the New Testament, sent His unique Son Jesus Christ, raised Him from the 
dead, gets personally involved with His people, and offers them eternal life in His glorious, eternal Kingdom.(24)  
To see all this from a different angle, it is undeniable that suffering and evil really exist. But it is comforting to know that it 
also happens in a universe where God raised Jesus from the dead, confirming His unique message. Therefore, even when 
we don't know why certain things happen as they do, we still have the assurance that there is a reason for all of it. This is 
what we mean by playing in the theistic ball park. Evil cannot be taken in isolation from the other relevant data, and that 
data explain evil much easier than evil can explain away all the evidence.  
E. Summary and Conclusion  
In this chapter we went on the "offensive" in favor of the theistic answer to the problem of evil. This is a seldom-used 
tactic, but is well warranted by the evidence. Strangely enough, naturalism has plenty of problems with the suffering in the 
world. We addressed four such predicaments. In the end, we even think that their struggles prove to be fatal.  
First, no contradictions in the theistic set have yet been proven. Atheologians have tried to do so, but have not generated 
the missing premise that would prove that theism is internally inconsistent. In fact, in addition to other responses, theists 
are always able to reply that since God does have certain attributes, there must be an adequate reason for the evil in the 
world.  
Second, atheologians have generally failed to recognize that there is no single problem of evil. Separate theistic systems 
respond differently to the various issues. Moreover, these are not external difficulties, but internal ones, affecting the 
consistency of a particular perspective. Additionally, suffering is a subjective, person-related issue; it bothers some theists, 
but not others. Just because critics are still not convinced does not count against theism any more than the reverse counts 
against naturalism.  
Third, naturalists are not able to raise the objection concerning evil either from their own system or as an argument in 
favor of naturalism. The reason for this is that naturalists who do not recognize the objectivity of ethical values have no 
basis from which to protest the presence of suffering. From their viewpoint, it is only an unfortunate consequence of life. 
While they may not like it, their own system does not allow them to recognize any objective complaints to lay at the 
theist's feet.  
The seemingly few naturalists who do accept objective values have the greater problem of explaining this phenomenon in a 
chance universe, especially since it is the major premise in the moral argument for God's existence. Thus, it would appear 
that, if evil really exists, so does God.  
Some atheologians have therefore been satisfied to offer evil as an internal critique of theism, pointing out that its views 
are inconsistent. But, fourth, we argued that such an internal charge does not exist in a vacuum, but must be evaluated 
along with the distinctive evidences for theism. It is a contest between world views. And it is easier to explain evil by the 
arguments for Christianity than it is for evil to eliminate all of these excellent evidences.  
This last point has interesting implications. Whereas theists seldom deny the reality of evil, admitting it along with all the 
other evidences, naturalists must deny virtually all (or perhaps even all) of the major evidences for a theistic universe.(25) 
This is another indication of the untenable nature of this world view.  
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